The purpose of this article is to investigate both cooperative and competitive strategies of firms that may cause accidents. In order to reduce accident probabilities and the amount of damage, each firm tries to improve the safety level of its products and these firms may exchange information about the previous accidents associated with their products. Thus, these firms may cooperate on this point. On the other hand, they compete on quantities, quality, prices, and so forth, after deciding whether accident information is to be disclosed. This situation is termed "coopetition."
Introduction
The use of past accident information is very important in preventing severe accidents such as death and serious illness. For example, automobile makers design and install safety features (child seat, air bag system) in response to the causes of past automobile accidents. Thus, if the firms could use accident information, they may be able to reduce the number of severe accidents.
From this view, sharing information with rivals creates more ideas on how to reduce accident probabilities and the amount of damage, because all firms have access to considerably more accident information. In other words, information sharing is an effective way of improving risk management.
There is a large literature that examines the role of information in the market. For example, Vives (1984) , Gar-Or (1985) , Shapiro (1986) , Sakai and Yamato (1989) , and Liu and Serfes (2006) focused on Cournot and/or Bertrand competition with imperfect information about costs or demand, and they examined the firm's incentives to share information. Sakai and Yoshizumi (1991) demonstrated the relationship between information sharing and the risk aversion of firms. Caminal and Vives (1996) analyzed consumers' learning in the case of asymmetric information on product quality. Liu and Serfes (2004) considered the role of information to classify consumers in a spatial market. Qiu and Zhou (2006) analyzed the relationship between information and mergers. Garidal-Thoron (2005) discussed insurance markets where accident information is not shared among insurers. Agrell et al. (2004) and Chu and Lee (2006) studied information sharing in supply-chain management.
However, in reality, each firm does not tend to disclose its accident information to rivals. There are several reasons for not disclosing accident information. First, disclosing accident information lowers demand. For example, some Japanese consumers avoided buying US beef after reports that it contained dangerous elements associated with mad cow disease. 1 In this case, they purchased beef from domestic producers or imported beef from countries other than the USA, or used other meats (pork and chicken) and fish. Second, disclosing accident information gives competitive advantages to their rivals. The firms that obtain accident information can lower not only effort costs for safety management but also costs for maintenance and compensation after sales. Thus, all firms want to receive accident information, but they do not want to
give it out themselves. 2 Using the terminology of microeconomic theory, rivals can be free riders regarding accident information. For example, Okura (2006) found that Japanese life insurance firms choose to withhold their information even if disclosing information is a Pareto-superior strategy. Each life insurance firm wants to free ride and does not want its competitors to free ride on the basis of its information, and so there is a unique equilibrium of "not disclosing information." In summary, firms may be reluctant to disclose their accident information because information sharing adversely affects competition after the information disclosure.
The purpose of this article is to investigate both the cooperative and competitive strategies of firms that may cause accidents. In order to reduce accident probabilities and the severity of damages, each firm attempts to improve the safety level of its products and these firms may exchange information about its previous accidents. Thus, these firms may cooperate in this regard. On the other hand, they compete on quantities, quality, prices, and so on, after deciding whether accident information is to be disclosed.
This situation, which contains both cooperation and competition, is called "coopetition"
by some authors (for example, Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) and Dagnino and Padula (2002) ). This article attempts to address the following three questions highlighted by the coopetition literature in relation to accident information.
(1) Can this coopetitive situation arise voluntarily? (2) If a coopetitive situation is never realized voluntarily, why isn't the accident information shared? (3) Is it desirable to realize the coopetitive situation by using some other mechanisms such as laws and regulations?
In order to answer the above three questions, we build an economic model with two firms facing the following three-stage game. In the first stage, both firms decide whether to disclose their accident information to their rival. In the second stage, they choose their effort level for improving the safety level of their products. In the third stage, they choose their quantities.
The remainder of this article is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce two serious accidents that occurred in 2006 in Japan. They are closely related to accident information sharing. In Section 3, we establish a model including decisions on information disclosure, effort for safety management, and sales quantity. The second and third stages of an original game are computed. Section 4 presents the equilibrium of an original game (subgame perfect equilibrium) and derives two important propositions and lemma. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.
There are three main conclusions in this article. First, in the three-stage game, there is a unique equilibrium where both firms choose to not disclose their information. Second, the outcome in equilibrium becomes Pareto inferior to the outcome where both firms choose to disclose their accident information when the condition relating to marginal effort costs and potential demand is met. Third, whether the coopetitive situation where firms exchange their accident information cooperatively and choose their quantity levels competitively is desirable for firms depends on the magnitude of demand reduction effect, which is defined as the difference between the potential demands in the cases of disclosure and nondisclosure.
The Actual Accidents
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In this section, we introduce two actual accidents that occurred in 2006 in Japan. We In a press conference held on July 14, 2006, the president of Paloma-Consolidated denied any responsibility for the accident, insisting that the cause of these accidents was not defective products but illegal remodeling. At press conferences held on July 18 and 31, 2006, the number of accidents was increased from 17 to 27 and the number of deaths was increased from 15 to 20, respectively. 5 Although he apologized for these accidents, he repeated the denial about responsibility for the accidents.
The METI demanded the voluntary recall of the products to Paloma-Consolidated.
According to a report from METI, 231 out of 18,221 instantaneous hot-water heaters were illegally remodeled. Furthermore, METI also revised the original bill of the At a press conference, Irisohyama admitted that the same type of shredder continued to sell after the accident had occurred. 9 The president of Irisohyama stated that this type of accident was a very rare case. After these accidents were revealed, many similar reports were received. For example, the shredders made by Ricoh Company caused seven similar accidents from 1985 to 1997.
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Because METI is also the responsible authority, the revised Consumer Product Safety
Law and the activities of the NCAC mentioned above may improve the safety of shredders. Lado et al. (1997) and Okura (2006 Okura ( , 2007 describe in detail the reasons for using game theory when analyzing coopetitive situations. 12 The justifications for this setting were provided in Okura (2007) . In brief, downstream activities first stage, both firms choose whether to disclose previous accident information to their rival. Firm i can reduce the effort cost to improve the safety level of its products if the rival firm discloses its accident information (
The Model
). In this case, firm i 's effort cost function can be written as:
On the other hand, if the rival firm does not disclose its accident information, firm i 's effort cost function can be written as:
where
. This means the firm can lower marginal effort cost by using the rival's accident information.
However, spreading the accident information may build a bad reputation and reduce demand. Thus, the demand function is given by:
where p denotes the market price, and i q represents the quantity supplied by firm i .
is potential demand and we assume that
. This assumption indicates that the more the accident information spreads to the public, the more potential demand falls.
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In the second stage, after observing both decisions, the firms choose their effort levels for safety management simultaneously. The higher the safety levels, the lower the expected costs such as maintenance and lawsuit costs that the firms may have to pay such as quantity setting are changed more easily than upstream activities such as information disclosure (for details, see Tirole (1988, Chapter 5) and Walley (2004) ) 13 If the accident information can spread completely secretly, potential demand is not lowered; that is,
after the sale of the product. 14 In the model, these expected costs can be expressed as:
where x denotes the maximum level of these expected costs, and we assume that DD x α < .
In the third stage, after observing both effort levels, the firms choose their product sales levels simultaneously. Each firm is assumed to be risk neutral and each profit function jk i π takes the form:
where analyze the second and third stages, given the decision taken in the first stage. Next, we check all four strategy sets, {disclose, disclose}, {disclose, not disclose}, {not disclose, disclose}, and {not disclose, not disclose}, in the subsequent section.
( ) ( ) ( )
The case of {disclose, disclose}
Assume that both firms disclose their accident information in the first stage. The first-order optimality conditions in the third stage are:
By combining equations (7) and (8), we obtain:
Substituting equations (9) and (10) into each profit function, it can be seen that:
The first-order optimality conditions in the second stage are:
Then, we have:
Substituting equation (15) into equations (11) and (12) 
The case of {not disclose, not disclose}
In this case, the equilibrium profits can be obtained by replacing the superscripts as follows. (17)
The case of {disclose, not disclose}
This is an asymmetric case where firm A discloses its accident information but firm B does not disclose. In this case, we can derive the first-optimality conditions in the third stage as follows.
By combining equations (18) and (19), we obtain:
Substituting equations (20) and (21) into each profit function, it can be seen that:
The first-order optimality conditions in the second stage are: 
Substituting equations (26) and (27) into equations (22) and (23), the equilibrium profits for each firm become:
The case of {not disclose, disclose} This is the opposite case. Firm A does not disclose its accident information, but firm B does disclose. Thus, the equilibrium profits can be obtained by replacing the superscripts as follows. 
Deriving the Equilibrium
Next consider the first stage. In Table 1 , firm A's decisions are identified in the rows and firm B's are identified in the columns. The left-hand value in each box is firm A's profit, and the right-hand value is firm B's profit.
From Table 1 , we can derive the following proposition.
Proposition 1:
In the three-stage game, {not disclose, not disclose} is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof:
Because . Thus, the firm that chooses the "disclose" strategy changes to the "not disclose" strategy when its rival initially chooses the "not disclose" strategy. The outcome in the subgame perfect equilibrium has a meaningful characteristic in the following proposition.
Q. E. D.
Proposition 2: The outcome in the subgame perfect equilibrium becomes Pareto inferior to the outcome where both firms choose the "disclose" strategy when the following condition is met.
Proof:
It is easy to calculate the following equation.
. (33) Thus, we can obtain the following condition because
From equation (34), we can derive equation (32).
The reason why the result is ambiguous, when both firms choose "disclose," there are two opposing effects. First, disclosing accident information increases firm profits through cost reduction (cost reduction effect). Second, it lowers potential demand from
(demand reduction effect). Thus, there is no unique result because we cannot compare the magnitudes of these effects. From proposition 2, it is easy to obtain the following lemma.
Lemma: If there is no demand reduction effect, that is,
, the outcome in the subgame perfect equilibrium is always Pareto inferior to the outcome when both firms choose the "disclose" strategy.
From this lemma, {not disclose, not disclose} always becomes Pareto inferior when the accident information is spread completely secretly. In this regard, we find that, if the demand reduction effect is small, it is desirable to disclose accident information through some mechanism because the cost reduction effect is constant. For this reason, revised
Consumer Product Safety Laws that coordinate cooperative information usage can realize a coopetitive outcome. On the other hand, if the demand reduction effect is so large that equation (33) is not satisfied, the remaining the subgame perfect equilibrium is desirable for firms.
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In summary, whether the coopetitive situation where firms exchange their accident information cooperatively and choose their quantity levels competitively is desirable for firms depends on the magnitude of the cost reduction and demand reduction effects.
Concluding Remarks
This article derives two propositions and one lemma. In Proposition 1, in the three-stage game that includes decisions on accident information disclosure, effort for safety management, and sales quantities, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where both firms choose to not disclose their accident information. Proposition 2 shows that the outcome in a subgame perfect equilibrium becomes Pareto inferior to the outcome where both firms choose the "disclose" strategy when the condition relating to marginal effort costs ( The Lemma demonstrates that whether the coopetitive situation where firms exchange their accident information cooperatively and choose their quantity levels competitively is desirable for firms depends on the magnitude of cost reduction and demand reduction effects. In this article, unlike Okura (2006 Okura ( , 2007 , coordinating some activities and realizing coopetitive situations may not be desirable for firms. In other words, the coordinator (for example, government and regulators) must consider whether the coordination is needed in reference to the exogenous situation. 
